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Abstract: There are two aspects through which  an economic policy  can  influence the 
economic situation – monetary and fiscal. Monetary and fiscal policies have different and 
sometimes controversial goals to achieve by means of specific instruments. While the 
mission of central banks is generally price stability, governments usually set their goals in 
the realm of economic growth and employment. Fiscal institutions, however, often use 
inflation in order to derive revenues  (seigniorage) and finance budget deficits. Hence, 
inflation is viewed as a public finance phenomenon (Barro, 1979; Mankiw, 1987; Grilli, 
1989). 
The purpose of this paper is to present a historical perspective on the behaviour of the 
monetary and fiscal policies pursued in Bulgaria from 1879, when the Bulgarian National 
Bank was established (soon after the liberation from the Ottoman Empire). Furthermore, 
historical time series of monetary and fiscal indicators give us the chance to study the 
link between government budget problems, fluctuations of monetary variables and 
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1.  Introduction 
 
There are two aspects through which  an  economic policy  can  influence the 
economic situation– monetary and fiscal. Monetary and fiscal policies have different and 
sometimes controversial goals to achieve by means of specific instruments. While the 
mission of central banks is price stability, governments set their goals in the realm of 
economic growth and employment. Fiscal institutions, however, often use inflation in 
order to derive revenues (seigniorage) and finance budget deficits. Hence, inflation is 
viewed as a public finance phenomenon (R. Barro 1987, G.  Mankiw 1987,  V.  Grilli 
1989). 
In central bankers’ language, the “long-term target” of this paper is inflation and 
how it is influenced by fiscal policies. The study does not dare to oppose the fact that 
inflation is a monetary phenomenon. It would rather apply this statement as a necessary 
condition. The interaction between fiscal and monetary institutions, however, reflects 
itself on price development. Hence, taking into account the role of monetary policies in 
setting prices, the present paper will try to estimate the influence of fiscal policies on 
money creation, and hence on inflation. 
The monetization of budget deficits resulting in inflation is known in literature as 
“fiscal dominance”  (King-Plosser 1985). It is, however, sometimes c onsidered a 
historical coincidence rather than a theoretical rule (Walsh 2003: 151). Then, how should 
it be considered when history repeats  itself? Bulgaria is an example of this, keeping 
recent memories of the devastating consequences of fiscal dominance on  the monetary 
policy in the first period of its transition which resulted in  hyperinflation and  the 
introduction of the currency board in mid-1997. Therefore, it is important to know our 
history well and to interpret it with a modern economic language, applying a quantitative 
analysis approach.  
The time span of the present study covers the monetary history of Bulgaria from 
the establishment of the Bulgarian National Bank  in 1 879  to  1947, when the 
nationalization of the economy took place. The time boundaries of this study are logically 
determined by  the set-up of the Bulgarian National  Bank, which closely followed the   3 
establishment of the political independence of Bulgaria from the Ottoman Empire in 
1878, while since 1947 when the centrally-planned economy was established budget 
balances were reported for a 5 -year period and prices were administratively set not 
reflecting the demand and supply factors.  Moreover, the banking system was a mono-
bank one  and  the  BNB functioned as a central and trade bank, financing various 
government structures without limits (Avramov 1999).  
The present paper starts with a brief review of the literature which argues that 
inflation could also be classified as a “fiscal phenomenon”. The third part introduces the 
historical background of this study, the legislation defining the relations between the 
central bank and the government institutions, and the research studies of that time 
providing evidence for the presence of a strong influence of fiscal policy on money 
creation. In section four, an empirical analysis is conducted and econometric estimations 
are derived in order to draw some conclusions and policy implications on the interaction 
between monetary and fiscal policies under different monetary regimes.         
2.  Review of the literature 
As mentioned in the introduction, the starting point of this paper is the theory 
which views inflation as a monetary phenomenon (Quantitative theory of money). Given 
that the output and velocity of money are constant in the long run, one can recall that in 
the context of the quantitative equation of money the price level is determined by the 
money supply in the economy
1. It is interesting, however, to establish what determines 
the money supply and if the fiscal policy has any influence on this. 
Several theoretical streams have attempted to answer these questions analyzing 
the intertemporal budget constraint. In brief, the logic of this constraint is that the sum of 
all government  budget balances  should be equal to zero at their present value. For 
example, a government with an issued public debt should attain budget surpluses in the 
future. The surplus could be generated by  future extra revenues from seigniorage or 
increase in taxes. Two representatives of the optimal seigniorage theory argue that the 
                                                  
1 M*V=P*Y, where M is money supply, V is velocity of money, P is the general price level and Y is 
national output (income).   4 
seigniorage coming from money creation is conditional upon the balance between budget 
expenditures and budget revenues (G. Mankiw 1987, V. Grilli 1989). 
Robert Barro studied the impact of government expenditures on money growth 
and found that temporary  changes in  government purchases raised money growth and 
inflation when the Gold Standard was suspended (R. Barro 1987). A positive correlation 
between money growth and budget deficits, however, can take place in the absence of 
fiscal impact on money creation (R. Barro 1979, E. Joines 1985: 331). If governments 
were to target real as opposed to nominal values of government debt, nominal debt would 
rise in proportion to the price level; so long as money growth and inflation are positively 
correlated, deficit and money growth should also be positively correlated in the absence 
of debt monetization by the central bank. 
King and Plosser coined the term “fiscal dominance”  in their seminal paper of 
1985, implying the potential influence of fiscal policies over monetary policies. In other 
words, fiscal dominance is a situation in which  the fiscal policy is set a priori, while the 
monetary policy generates enough seigniorage to satisfy the intertemporal budget 
constraint.  Leeper (1991) generalized the case  to  one of a ctive fiscal and passive 
monetary policies. Long-term historical studies provide different categories of evidence 
as to the presence of fiscal dominance over money creation in Italy (Fratianni-Spinelli 
2001), and in Spain (M. Sabate et al. 2004) from the time when the Bank of Spain was 
granted note issue monopoly to the Second World War (WWII). 
At the very opposite pole of the quantitative theory of money is the so called 
“Fiscal theory of prices”. It comprises a number of studies attempting to constitute 
inflation as a pure fiscal phenomenon excluding the intermediation of monetary policies 
(Chr. Sims 1994, M. Woodford 1995, 2001). This theory focuses on a variety of prices 
satisfying the money market equilibrium, and on the fiscal authority as the one which sets 
the “equilibrium price”. In contrast to other theoretical streams, the fiscal theory of prices 
interprets the intertemporal budget constraint as a framework rather than as a constraint 
which has to be fulfilled at any given price level. Yet, i t has to be met only at the 
equilibrium price and the nominal  government debt plays a crucial role in setting the 
price level.   5 
This approach  has its  critics, which seriously object to  the argument that the 
intertemporal budget constraint is met only at equilibrium (B. McCallum 2001, W. Buiter 
2002). The increasing number of papers dedicated to the fiscal theory of prices, however, 
raises interesting questions not only in the field of monetary theory, but also concerning 
monetary policies.    
3.  Bulgarian historical background and legislation  
Bulgaria attained independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1878 and in less than 
a year the Bulgarian National Bank (BNB) was established as a  state  trade bank 
responsible for the financial intermediation of the foreign trade and for the stability of the 
national currency – the Lev. According to its statute, the  BNB was subordinated to the 
Ministry of Finance and most decisions concerning monetary policies were subject to 
agreement or permission by the Minister himself (R. Avramov 1999). Before the BNB 
was granted the privilege to issue  banknotes in 1885 (only gold-backed banknotes), 
different foreign currencies were allowed to circulate and the Ministry of Finance was 
responsible for the coinage of the Bulgarian Lev.  
Although Bulgaria legally introduced a bimetallic system of the Latin Monetary 
Union type (1880), a silver standard was de facto in practice due to the enforced high 
value of silver money and particularly of the Russian Silver Ruble (N. Kiosseva, 2000). 
As a result of the money market  which was flooded with  silver coins, a  difference 
between the legal and  the  market price of silver coins appeared  – an agio,  varying 
between 4% and 9 %. The  BNB efforts to manage money in circulation were vain; it 
accumulated losses since it was obliged to respect the legal parity of silver to gold at the 
ratio 15.5:1 and did not have any instrument to limit the silver coins minted by the 
financial authority upon budget needs (Dimitrova-Fantacci 2010a). Several years after its 
neighbouring countries, Bulgaria demonetized the Russian Silver Ruble  in 1887  and 
prohibited the circulation of foreign coins which almost lead to the disappearance of the 
agio. 
In 1891 the BNB got the legal right to issue silver-backed banknotes in order to 
have a better control of the money in circulation, but instead of activating this privilege, 
the Ministry of Finance preferred to put a new volume of Bulgarian silver coins into   6 
circulation. Only in 1899 the BNB was de facto allowed to start issuing silver-backed 
banknotes against providing more credit to the government. 
As stated in the Law dating back to 1885: “ The BNB credit to the government 
could not exceed more than 1/5 of its capital”, which equaled 1 824 thousand  levs 
expressed in absolute term. Until 1889 the government obtained money from the  BNB 
sporadically and against government securities (BNB 1929: 132). At the outbreak of the 
economic crisis at the end of the XIX century, Bulgarian fiscal authorities began to 
receive regular direct credits from the central bank for its short-term needs. The treasury, 
however, at the same time kept some deposits at the bank for some fiscal transactions. 
Since 1902 the BNB loans to the government increased and became a permanent 
item on the asset side of its balance sheets, apart from the credits received from abroad. 
This was a period of huge construction of public goods, such as railway and motorway 
building, financed both by local and foreign resources (BNB 1929: 138). In spite of the 
fact that the Law in 1906 did not put any qualitative constraint on central bank financing 
of the budget, it stated that the central bank could extend credit to the government only 
for short-term (up to 3 months) needs. A new amendment of the Law in 1911 clarified 
that the BNB was allowed to provide financial support to the budget for “less than its 
nominal capital”, i.e. 20 000 levs.      
From 1912 until 1922 the BNB did not have any limit on the credits provided to 
the government for war financing as Bulgaria entered a long period of wars  - the Balkan 
wars and First World War (WWI).  As a consequence, the public finances were 
completely destroyed. Moreover, b eing defeated in WW-I, Bulgaria  faced the heavy 
burden of war debts and had to provide huge sums for debt services. This resulted in the 
inability of the MF to put public finance in order for almost a decade. 
In 1924 radical efforts for monetary stabilization - among which harder budget 
constraints on the public finance  - were enforced.  The  BNB direct credit to the 
government was stabilized at a certain limit since according to the new Law “the overall 
credit to the government should not exceed 4.700 m illion  levs”. The extra fiscal needs, 
however, were met by credits from abroad and negotiated with the League of Nations. In 
1926 Bulgaria obtained the so called Refugees’ Loan, which was provided to cover the 
expenses for Bulgarian refugees from neighbouring countries at the change of the   7 
boundaries after WW-I. Two years later the government was granted the Stabilization 
Loan for the implementation of the monetary stabilization, in compliance with the 
international agreements. Although the stabilization in Bulgaria started de facto in 1924, 
it was legalized in 1928 when the Gold exchange standard was introduced (R. Avramov 
1999, 152). 
According to the  new  statute,  the  BNB should have acted as an independent 
central bank. It was only a short time, however, before  the first signs of the Great 
Depression appeared. The world liquidity crisis worsened the budget balance and the 
government was in n eed of more extra financing (seigniorage). There was a legislative 
provision  at the end of 1928 stating that the government should repay its debt to the 
central bank, but it was never put into practice and was dropped out of  the Law shortly 
after  with the  permission of the Financial Committee of the L eague of  Nations. 
Furthermore, the amendment stated that “the BNB net profit and seigniorage should not 
be used to pay back the government debt to the central bank, but for current expenses of 
the Treasury”. 
At the outbreak of WWII the government did not provide any sums in the budgets 
to repay  its debt to the BNB. The new Law dating back to 1937 seemed to put some 
obligations on the budget to repay its debt to the central bank by  requiring that the 
Treasury should buy back government securities from the BNB at the value of 1 billion 
levs. At the same time the government was allowed to get direct credit from the monetary 
authorities. Therefore, this was simply a balance sheet transaction between two 
components of the g overnment debt to the central bank resulting in no decrease of its 
total stock. Moreover, there was no limit for the BNB to credit the budget. 
One of the latest amendments of  the BNB Law for the period under study said 
that “the  BNB will extend an additional amount of money not exceeding 140% of the 
capital and reserves against government securities provided by foreign companies for 
government purchases, which have to be  cleared  in less than 7 years” (1940).  These 
purchases were mostly from German companies in the period of the clearing agreements 
and compensation deals in the 1930s
2.   
                                                  
2 For more details on the exchange rate control in Bulgaria in the interwar period see Nenovsky and 
Dimitrova (2007).    8 
4.  Evidence of fiscal influence on money creation 
Our analysis of the long-term record of the fiscal influence on money creation in 
Bulgaria and hence on inflation will incorporate an interdisciplinary approach. First, we 
will provide a descriptive evidence from the literature of the interaction between fiscal 
and monetary authorities. Then, we will proceed with empirical evidence showing the 
development of the indicators o f interest in different periods of time characterized by 
specific monetary arrangements. Finally, the last piece of evidence will be generated by 
the application of econometric tools to the respective variables.      
4.1 Evidence in the literature 
Central  bank dependence on fiscal  policy has been  the focus of Bulgarian 
economic critics. There are a lot of studies which provide evidence for the influence of 
the fiscal policy on inflation and the role of the central bank in budget financing.  
Prof. Yordanov provides a critical research of the BNB balance sheets, arguing 
that - since its establishment - the central bank financed the government in various ways 
and did not keep proper records of this financing (D. Yordanov 1910). His thorough 
analysis was based on weekly balance sheet data, resulting in  the finding that for some 
periods of time the item “current account of the government” (which usually had a credit 
balance) was merged with the item “current non-interest bearing accounts” (ending with a 
debit balance); thus, the BNB balance sheets did not allow to make a precise evaluation 
of the overall credit to the government. Moreover, he found out that among the credits 
extended to companies and  individuals, some  “were  guaranteed by the  Ministry of 
Finance or the Minister of Finance himself”. (D. Yordanov: 1910: 26). 
Another study provides a longer record of the influence of fiscal policy over 
money creation (St. Bochev 1924). The author made an evaluation of the overall credit to 
the government based on information from the text of the annual report, analyzing the 
purposes of various credits extended by the central bank. It turned out that his figures 
were quite different from the ones reported in the balance sheets, because apart from the 
direct credit, they also included financing of various public funds, financing provided for 
public  foreign debt service among others. Stoyan Bochev concludes his study on  the   9 
BNB as an emission institute with the argument that “the state financial policy dominates 
BNB emission policy” (St. Bochev 1924: 29). 
In his “Course on banking in Bulgaria” at the Economic Department of Sofia 
University, Prof. Assen Christophoroff stated that George Knapp’s book “State Theory of 
Money” played a crucial role in the collapse of the Gold Standard and the emergence of  
fearful inflation in the world (A. Christophoroff 1946: 26). Studying different episodes of 
the Bulgarian banking system with the BNB playing the central role, he argued that the 
central bank almost constantly financed the government, reaching its extremes in the war 
years. Even in periods of time when the BNB was forced to limit its function of banknote 
emission (during the stabilization), the government enhanced coinage in order to provide 
the necessary extra revenues from the seigniorage (K. Nedelchev 1940); hence the fiscal 
policy again interfered in money creation, which was  no longer under the control of 
monetary authority. 
Summarizing various studies dedicated to the interaction between Bulgarian 
monetary, banking and financial institutions on one hand, and the governments on the 
other hand, a recent fundamental book argues that the creation and development of the 
financial system in Bulgaria has been dominated by the state, fiscal  policy and 
communal, municipal needs of financing (R. Avramov 2007).     
  4.2 Empirical evidence 
As mentioned by some contemporaries, there were various ways in which fiscal 
policy interfered in the money supply and thus determined the rate of inflation. If we look 
only at the monetization of budget deficits and public debt through the central bank, apart 
from the conventional direct credit to the government and purchases of treasury bonds, 
there were also credits extended to state institutions and funds. Moreover, there were 
credits granted to companies and even individuals which were qualified as “guaranteed” 
by the Ministry of Finance (D.  Yordanov 1910). Last but not least, we should  also 
mention the high share of  the  BNB profit (around 70% on average) generated 
predominantly from seigniorage and devoted to the fiscal authorities
3.  
 
                                                  
3 The share is calculated on the basis of information from various issues of BNB Annual reports.    10 








Looking at the  central bank’s balance sheet, among all the channels of budget 
financing elaborated we can construct a series of the BNB financing to the government 
consisting only of direct credit to the government and treasury bonds. Being aware of the 
fact that this will not be exhaustive as there are other channels of budget financing 
independent from the central bank’s financing, we will have to consider an alternative 
indicator for government financial needs. However, studying the government component 
of the monetary base decomposition into uses and sources (chart 1), which is similar to 
the money growth accounting analysis employed in the book by Cagan (1965), requires 
taking into account  as  many  channels of fiscal interference on money creation as 
possible. Therefore, we should also analyze the overall budget deficit (including extra 
budget revenues and expenditures) as a major source of fiscal influence on the monetary 
policy.  
In the framework of the monetary base analysis (chart 1), the classification of the 
uses of the monetary base is not very simple since the BNB acted simultaneously both as 
an issuing and a  commercial bank. Until 1927 there was no requirement for banks’ 
reserve in place and they were not reported separately from the overall demand deposits. 
Therefore, the monetary base comprises  banknotes in circulation  until 1927  and 
banknotes in circulation plus banks’  demand deposits since 1 927,  when trade banks 
started to maintain accounts at the central bank as a part of the stabilization package. 
 
Sources  Uses 
Monetary base=  
Money in circulation 





(credit + G securities) 
Other domestic credit    11 
The  first piece of  empirical evidence  of the relationship between  fiscal and 
monetary  policies  -  considering both the overall credit from the central bank to the 
government and its impact on inflation - is supposed to be underlying in the development 
of the respective variables (table 1). Studying the annual growth rates of the monetary 
base uses (on the liabilities side), credit to the government  (on the asset side), and 
inflation as a resulting variable, we can observe similar behaviour of the three indicators 
over different periods of times. The overall budget deficit during the Bimetallic standard 
does not seem to be  significant, which might be  due to the fact that this balance 
incorporates extra revenues stemming from the seigniorage of silver coinage.  The 
monetary base and particularly the credit to the government experienced high average 
growth rates of 65.6% and 83.7% respectively, due to their very low starting levels in 
absolute terms. Inflation was also comparatively low on average (1.3%), speeding up at 
the end of the period. 
Table 1. Public budget balance, monetary base, credit to the government and inflation 








Bimetallism (1879-1905)  -0.1  83.7  65.6  1.3 
Gold standard (1906-
1911) 
2.6  15.1  20.9  3.6 
Inconvertibility and war 
years (1912-1923) 
-7.2  80.7  39.0  30.3 
Stabilization (1924-1930)  -7.9  -4.9  1.7  -5.4 
Exchange control and 
WW-II (1931-1945) 
-1.2  15.2  79.9  16.1 
Whole period  -2.9  44.7  34.1  9.3 
Note: Data on monetary base, credit to the government and inflation are reported as annual growth rates 
(%). Public budget balance is reported as normalized with budget revenues, (%). 
During the short-lived Classical Gold Standard, which started to function in 1906 
and ended with the outbreak of the Balkan wars in 1912, the budget balance was on 
average on surplus for the period as a result of provided foreign financing. The credit to 
the government and monetary base grew at a lower rate as the replacement of coins with 
fiduciary means of payments (banknotes) resulted in inflation of 3.6% period average. 
With the outbreak of the Balkan wars in 1912, Bulgaria entered a long period of wars and   12 
inconvertibility. As a result of the extra budget war expenditures, the public budget 
balance ended with a huge deficit of  -7.2% of revenues average for the period. This 
inevitably required extra financing (80.7%) from the BNB as the foreign capital markets 
were not accessible. Banknotes in circulation speeded up at 39%  period average and 
resulted in the highest inflation period under study (30.3% period average)
4.    
Stabilization was a very painful period of deflation for the economy, characterized 
by  monetary contraction  resulting in  1.7% growth rate on average and leading  to a 
negative inflation of 5.4%
5. The efforts to put hard budget constraints on the government 
were obvious in the 4.9% decrease of the overall BNB credit to the fiscal authorities. The 
inability of the government to serve its huge war debt burden and to put the public 
finance in order resulted in a negative balance - bigger than the one recorded during the 
period of inconvertibility. 
Soon after the legalization of the monetary stabilization in late 1928, Bulgaria 
started to experience the first symptoms of the Great Depression and opted for  an 
exchange control regime. The overall budget balance was not extremely negative and the 
credit to the government grew at the rate of 15.2%, close to the one recorded during the 
Gold standard. The monetary base, however, grew at quite a faster rate (79.9%) due to 
the fast accumulating foreign assets held in German currency in blocked accounts, as a 
result of the clearing agreement with Germany. After overheating the economy, the high 
devaluation of the German Mark left empty assets on the BNB balance sheet and resulted 
in high inflation of 16.1% period average in Bulgaria
6. 
Summarizing the development of the indicators for the whole period, it is easy to 
see that monetary base and the BNB credit to the government grow with somewhat close 
rates of 44.7% and 34.1% respectively. In other words, we can argue that both were in 
close relation and that a big amount of the budget financing was carried out through the 
BNB. There were, however, some periods when the fiscal interferences were not captured 
by the direct financing provided by the central bank to the government, and when the 
budget deficit would serve as a better proxy for the finance needs of the public finance. 
                                                  
4 The hyperinflation in 1922 recorded 55.3% annual average rate of inflation. 
5 Nenovsky and Dimitrova (2006) provide more details on the stabilization in Bulgaria. 
6 In 1945 the annual average inflation was 65%.   13 
The average growth rates,  however,  are static estimates which do not necessarily 
characterize every point in time under study.   
Another piece of evidence  can  be found in the  application of statistical 
correlations.  Although the  cross-correlation matrix (table 2) provides us with 
comparatively low degrees of correlation for the development of all three variables, we 
can still rank them. If we look at them closely, we can see that the correlation between 
the budget balance and  monetary base is the highest of all (0.21), followed by the 
correlation between the monetary base and the BNB credit to the government (0.17), and 
thirdly by the correlation between the budget deficit and the direct financing provided by 
the central bank to the fiscal authority (0.15).     




Budget balance  Monetary base  BNB credit to the 
government 
Budget balance  1  0.21  0.15 
Monetary base  0.21  1  0.17 
BNB credit to the 
government 
0.15  0.17  1 
Note: All variables are normalized with budget revenues, as monetary base and credit to the government 
represent the first difference of the normalized values. 
One explanation for the overall low correlations might be the fact that we 
consider only banknotes in circulation for the period until the bank deposits appear as a 
separate item in  the BNB balance sheets, while the fiscal impact on money creation is 
reflected also by the development of coins in circulation. The seigniorage of coinage and 
particularly of silver coins was a main source of extra budget revenues until banknotes 
got proper circulation in 1906 (Dimitrova-Fantacci, 2010b). 
Furthermore, the limited coverage of the monetary base constrained to the 
banknotes in circulation and bank deposits might further produce the weak correlation, 
since the mixture of functions of issuing and trade bank most probably resulted in transfer 
of resources from other accounts. There are supporting statements for this deduction in 
some studies which argue that, for a certain period of time, the central bank extended   14 
credits to the government from individuals’ deposits at its disposal (D. Yordanov 1910, 
St. Bochev 1924). Unfortunately, the BNB balance sheets before 1927 do not allow us to 
study  the different components of the aggregately reported demand deposits.
7 On the 
other  hand,  as we mentioned above  the variable indicating the BNB credit to the 
government, i.e. direct credit to the government and treasury bonds, is not exhaustive. 
Summarizing, the ranking of correlations suggests that the indicator of budget 
financing carried out through the BNB is really not  representative enough  for  the 
financial needs of the budget and that the overall budget balance would serve better as a 
proxy of the fiscal interference in money creation. Although this piece of evidence has 
the characteristics of the dynamic statistical analysis, the correlation is not strong enough 
to draw the conclusion that there is a strong fiscal influence on money creation and hence 
on inflation (E. Joines 1985, p.331).  
4.3. Econometric estimation 
The econometric estimation of the influence of fiscal policies on inflation through 
the  monetization of public deficits starts with the determination of the direction of 
causality between  the budget balance and the monetary base. Determining the causality 
relationship is important to ensure that there was fiscal interference in the monetary 
policy. Otherwise, we can observe positive correlation between government deficits and 
the growth of the monetary base in the lack of any effect of fiscal dominance (R. Barro 
1979).  We will apply  the Granger  test according to which the causality  relationship 
implies that A causes B, if lagged values of A improve the forecast of B (C. Granger 
1969)
8.   
 
 
                                                  
7 Since 1927 demand deposits have been reported into three components: bank deposits, government 
deposits and private deposits with average shares in the aggregate indicator of 35.7%, 23.3% and 50% 
respectively.    
8 To ensure the validity of the test all variables should first meet the stationarity tests, i.e. both variables are 
taken as normalized with budget revenues and the monetary base represents the first difference of its 
normalized values.     15 
Table 3. Granger causality test 
Null Hypothesis  F-statistics  Probability 
     
MB does not Granger cause BB   0.15440  0.8573 
BB does not Granger cause MB  4.40503  0.0174 
The Granger causality test allows us to estimate the causality relationship between 
both variables simultaneously. According to the rule of thumb, the first row tells us that 
we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the monetary base does not cause budget deficit. 
At the same time, we have a rough estimate for the causality relationship from the budget 
balance towards the monetary base (the second row) as the null hypothesis can be 
rejected at 1% level. Having estimated this relationship, we can now proceed with 
providing an estimate of the coefficient of fiscal influence on money creation.  
  The last piece of evidence  is provided by an econometric estimation of the 
interaction between fiscal and monetary policies. For that purpose we will apply Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) regressions to estimate the simple equation: 
t BB MB u b b + + = 1 0 , 
Where MB stands for monetary base (first difference of normalized values), BB is 
the overall public budget balance (normalized values),  o b and   1 b  are coefficients, and 
t u  stands for the residuals.  The coefficient of interest is  1 b , which characterizes the 
relationship between fiscal balance and money creation (table 4)
9. 
The econometric results confirm the existence of fiscal impact on the increase of 
monetary base for the whole period and, hence, on inflation. The coefficient is  high 
enough (0.66) to argue that there was fiscal dominance over the monetary policy 
conducted  in Bulgaria. The comparatively high adjusted R -squared also suggests that 
there was a considerable  monetization of fiscal debts and that the  central bank was 
dependent on fiscal authorities (R. Avramov 2007).    
                                                  
9 The variables are the same as the ones to which the Granger causality test was applied.   16 
Table 4. Econometric results 
Period 
1 b  
Whole period (1889 - 1947)  0.66 
t-statistics  4.18 
Adj. R-squared  0.78 
   
Bimetallism and Gold Standard (1889-1911)  -0.06 
t-statistics  -1.64 
Adj. R-squared  0.64 
   
Wars and Interwar years  (1912-1945)  0.73 
t-statistics  6.28 
Adj. R-squared  0.82 
For the first sub-period of bimetallic and gold monetary standards, the regression 
generates a negative and negligible, although statistically  insignificant (t-statistics < 2), 
coefficient of  -0.06, suggesting  that  the fiscal policy was  not a determinant of the 
development of the monetary base, and therefore not an inflationary factor.  A possible 
explanation for this might be the comparatively small sums received by the government 
through the central bank under these monetary arrangements (A. Christophoroff 1946, 
34).  Another  contending  explanation for this n egative  relationship between budget 
financing and  money creation could be  the limited money creation  through banknote 
emissions. In fact, 74% of all the money in circulation until 1914 was represented by 
silver coins. Coinage, however, was a privilege of t he fiscal authorities, hence not 
presented in the central bank’s liabilities, and it was often exercised to derived 50% 
seigniorage on average to finance the budget directly (Dimitrova-Fantacci 2010b). A 
persistent agio (a difference between the market and the official silver-to-gold ratio) 
appeared as a result of this high supply of silver coins, together with the high supply of 
silver-backed banknotes since 1899 (Dimitrova-Fantacci 2010a). It was not until 1906 
that the gold standard was de facto introduced and the banknotes in circulation became a 
true means of money creation.  
    As expected, the highest coefficient (0.73) is attained during the war years. War 
years are usually characterized by a stronger interaction between fiscal and monetary 
authorities and experience extreme degrees of fiscal dominance (Fratianni-Spinelli 2001).   17 
For the sake of having a high enough number of observations, the time series also covers 
the  inconvertibility,  interwar years (stabilization) and  exchange control regime. 
Integrating the inconvertibility period is justified by the experience of a heavy war debt 
burden as a consequence of the wars which required financing from the central bank. The 
exchange control regime covers the years of the  Great  Depression in Bulgaria when 
foreign financing was inaccessible, and the strong economic and later political relations 
with Germany before the outbreak of the Second World War. Only the stabilization 
period presents a different development of the indicators under study. Although it is a 
deflationary period, it is short enough and smaller by degrees relative to the rest of the 
period to change the relationship from positive to negative.    
5.  Conclusion and policy implications 
 
Applying different research approaches - historical, statistical and econometric - 
we have found various kinds of evidence  – descriptive and empirical  -  for the fiscal 
impact on money creation, and hence on inflation.  The  general outcome of the study 
indicates that there was a fiscal influence on money creation, which was translated into 
price increases through the channels of a transmission mechanism. 
Studying the interaction between fiscal and monetary policies in different periods 
characterized by specific monetary arrangements, this impact turned out to be higher 
during and after times of wars and financial instability, and negligible - if any at all - 
during the metallic standards. Our results suggest that different monetary regimes allow 
the presence of fiscal  interferences in money creation  to different extents.  Not 
surprisingly, the fiscal impact on  the monetary base (taking only fiduciary money) is 
weaker during the Bimetallic and Gold Standard, and during the monetary stabilization in 
the 20’s when the international monetary system was based on national currencies fixed 
either to the gold parity or gold exchange ratio. Assuming the parallel between the Gold 
Standard mechanism and  currency board  arrangement as  appropriate ( Desquilbet-
Nenovsky 2004), we could argue that the latter one is a regime generating the low ‘fiscal’ 
inflation by putting hard budget constraints on government financing.   18 
Although it is still disputable whether and how the fiscal dominance concept can 
be presented as a theoretical postulate (C. Walsh 2003), it has been put into practice for a 
long time.  Unfortunately, it does not belong only to the past.  Fratianni and Spinelli 
(2001) argue that the whole monetary history of Italy, up to its joining the euro area, is 
characterized by the constant monetization of budget deficits. Blanchard (2004) provides 
recent evidence from Brazil as to fiscal dominance under inflation targeting regime. 
Bulgaria also experienced the consequences of fiscal dominance over money creation at 
the beginning of its transition period, forgetting its monetary history of the pre-centrally-
planned economy. The result was hyperinflation, which was solved by introducing the 
currency board, enabling the central bank to act as an independent monetary institute and 
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